

Section A: Project Proposal

Conflict and Institutional Change in India¹

Introduction

The project, which forms part of the Crisis States Programme coordinated by Dr James Putzel of DESTIN at the London School of Economics and Political Science, is located in the Developing Countries Research Centre [DCRC] of the University of Delhi. The DCRC is an interdisciplinary research centre, which brings together scholars who study politics in the developing world in a comparative perspective.

The project will be directed by Dr Neera Chandhoke, Professor Department of Political Science, University of Delhi, and Joint Director DCRC, and Dr Manindra Thakur, Reader in the department of Political Science Zakir Hussain College, University of Delhi, and Deputy Director DCRC.

Work on the project will begin from the 1st of September 2003 and it will span a period of two years that is till the end of August 2005.

I

Objectives of the Research

The main objective of the research project is to examine the possibility of establishing a series of *causal* connections between conflict and institutions in India. Within this broad objective we wish to concentrate on the following research questions.

- **What is the relationship between rules that have historically emerged in and for a particular society and the outbreak of violent conflict?** [see appendix, chart 1]

This question we consider, is significant, simply because institutions or rules influence and shape political strategies in civil society. ‘Institutions’, suggest the historical institutionalists Thelen and Steinmo, ‘are not just another variable, and the institutionalist claim is more than just that “institutions matter too”. By shaping not just actors’ strategies... but their goals as well, and by mediating their relations of cooperation and conflict, institutions structure political situations and leave their own imprint on political outcomes’². If this is so, we need to investigate why political groups in civil society come to espouse strategies that tend to outstrip the mandate of rules? Why do groups, in other words, resort to extra-institutional means to press their claims upon the body politic? What are the reasons that prompt actors in civil society to transgress rules and opt for the use of violence? Do political demands on institutions exceed the capacity of these institutions to contain and regulate relationships? Or do the rules themselves or changes in the rules lead to specific consequences that prompt the eruption of violent conflict?

¹ Wherever the term ‘conflict’ is used in the research proposal it refers to cases where the parties to the conflict have systematically employed violence over a period of time. It does not refer to, for instance, cases of clashes of interests, which can be resolved within existing frameworks of rules. It also does not refer to those cases where the use of violence is episodic and short term, for example the kind of violence that may erupt when collective anger overtakes the members of a demonstration or a procession, and when they run amuck, burning buses and public property, or attacking passerby’s.

² Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, (1992) edited *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), pg 9.

It is admittedly impossible to identify *one* reason or one set of reasons for the outbreak of violent conflict. It is also true that the reasons for the outbreak of conflict reach back into history and cannot be traced to one specific temporal moment. Therefore, within the complex of historical reasons that we hope to identify as the motives for the outburst of violent conflict [as opposed to conflict that is amenable to resolution within and through rules] we will identify and foreground the role of (selected) institutions.

- **The second objective of this research project is to explore the *impact of conflict on rules that have been historically shaped in and for a society.***

Conflict is of course endemic to any complex, inegalitarian and hierarchical society such as India. Arguably, the significance of institutions and organisations lies in the fact that they not only negotiate potentially explosive situations, they contain conflict within manageable proportions and through specified means. Therefore, we can assume that the outbreak of violent conflict constitutes a crisis for institutions in particular and for the country in general. And crisis has led, in many parts of the world, to the phenomenon of 'failed states'. The question we wish to ask in this precise connection is: how do crises affect rules? For once political actors in civil society employ means that lie beyond the reach of institutions; institutions will inevitably undergo a process of change or transformation. What is the nature of the transformation that is wrought in institutions by conflict? [see appendix chart 2]

- **The third objective of this project is not only to identify, but also to *evaluate the changes wrought in rules in and through violent conflict.***

This exercise is necessarily normative. For we believe that any analytical exploration of a given research question is not separable from the larger questions that relate to normative issues or to what is or is not politically desirable for a society that possesses democratic credentials. In democracies, therefore, an intellectual exploration of the causal relationship between conflict and institutions will intrinsically be tied up to the larger normative issue of whether changes in rules deepen democracy or restrict it.

- **The fourth objective of this project is comparative. We will examine why the negotiation/management/suppression of conflict leads to different outcomes in analogous cases.**

Consider that the causes of conflict in two cases may be the same, social and economic deprivation for instance. And yet whereas one conflict may have been resolved successfully, the other continues to prove intractable and defy resolution. Why is this so? Towards this end, we will compare and contrast two conflict situations: one of which has been managed with some success, and the second that continues to elude negotiation, in order to find out whether causal relationships between institutions and conflict are generalisable or whether they are historically specific.

- **The fifth objective of this project is exploratory. We wish to investigate the possibilities of developing a model of institutions, which may prove both appropriate and effective in addressing conflict and negotiating it.**

This we consider is of enormous importance simply because the rules that govern the project of collective life in India have not been generated through autonomous processes. However, most theorists of institutionalism assume that the processes through which societies adopt rules are independent of external interference.. North for instance is of the opinion that rules, whether they are formal and legally binding, or customary are

'humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction'³. Does this formulation hold good for postcolonial societies such as India? For the assumption that rules represent shared understandings does not take into consideration the fact that many of these rules were imposed by colonial powers. Consequently rules that existed in the country prior to colonialism have been marginalised. The rules of property or land relations can be cited as one such example. And it is possible that abrupt changes in rules may lead to conflict. We plan, therefore, to explore alternative institutional/organisational models, which may be better equipped to contain conflict.

This research project focuses on four states in India that have experienced violent conflict in order to arrive at informed, systematic, and rigorous generalisations on patterns of causal relationship between conflict and institutions.

Secondly, we will attempt cross-state, cross-category, and intra-category comparisons in order to elucidate different patterns of the relationship between institutions and conflict as well as different outcomes. The four states are: Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir [with special attention to the Kashmir valley], West Bengal, and Andhra Pradesh.

Significance of the Research

Scholars have put forth various explanatory models to explain why groups in Punjab and Kashmir [the first two of our case studies] have adopted violence in order to make their claims on the body politic⁴. Notions such as the 'Pakistan factor', security, sub-nationalism, ethnicity, fundamentalism, terrorism, and cultural identity, constitute some of the central and enduring themes of these models. However, the one dimension that we consider is of crucial importance to explaining violence in these two states-that of institutions-has not been given enough attention in the various explanations on offer. We intend to focus on this very *missing link*. Correspondingly little intellectual work, which would investigate the impact of violence on institutions, as well as the relationship between institutions and conflict, has been carried out so far. This project attempts to fill in precisely this *lack* in the literature available on violent conflict and institutional change in Punjab and in Kashmir.

Interpretations of the Naxalite problem in West Bengal and in Andhra Pradesh [the other two of our case studies] generally tend to focus on the ideology, on the strategy, and on the shortcomings of the Naxalite movement⁵. Though the available literature deals with the causes for the outbreak of armed struggle in these two states, no systematic study of the connection between institutions and conflict in this particular context has been conducted so far. The question we wish to ask is: can we trace a causal connection between institutions and the recourse to armed struggle by groups in civil society? More importantly we wish to investigate whether violent conflict in both the states has led to

³ Douglass C. North (1990) *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge, Cambridge University press), pg 4.

⁴ Among others see Sumit Ganguly (2002) *Conflict Unending. Indo-Pakistani Tension since 1947* (New York, Columbia University press), Maya Chadda (1997) *Ethnicity, Security, and Separatism in India* (New York, Columbia University Press), Ved Marwah, (1995) *Uncivil Wars* (Delhi, Lancers), and Afsar Karim (1991) *Counter-Terrorism: The Pakistani Factor* (New Delhi, Lancer)

⁵ See Prakash Louis (2002) *The Naxalite Movement in Central Bihar* (Delhi, Wordsmiths), Committee of Concerned Citizens (1998) *In Search of Democratic Space* (Hyderabad, Committee of Concerned Citizens), K. Balagopal (1988) *Probing in the Political Economy of Agrarian Classes and Conflict* (Hyderabad, Perspectives), Rabindra Ray (1988) *The Naxalites and their Ideology* (Delhi, Oxford University Press), Sumanta Bannerjee (1980) *In the Wake of Naxalbari* (Calcutta, Subarnekha), Marcus Franda (1971) *Radical Politics in West Bengal* (Cambridge, Mass, MIT press)

the restructuring of rules themselves. In sum it is our endeavour to shift attention away from the *text* to the *institutional* context in which these struggles arose and were negotiated, as well as shift academic focus to the impact of violence on institutions. This may be of some significance, for ‘institutional contradictions’ as two scholars put it, ‘are the bases of the most important political conflicts in our society, it is through these politics that the institutional structure is transformed. A key task of social analysis is to understand those contradictions and to specify the conditions under which they shape organisational and individual action’⁶.

A focus on institutions, we believe, is of utmost importance to any political inquiry, simply because institutions provide opportunities for as well as constraints on political strategies in civil society. This is mainly the reason why historical institutionalists foreground the significance of institutions in collective life. However, the one *additional* question that needs to be asked for societies such as India is: why have groups in civil society adopted methods that lie outside the opportunity costs prescribed by institutions? Is this because the rules themselves are wanting? And if groups adopt means that lie outside the provenance of the mandate laid down by institutions, what impact does this have on the institutions themselves? That is, even if ‘normalcy’ is restored, and the crisis managed to some effect, do institutions remain as they were before the outbreak of violence or do they undergo some changes? And if this is so, is it a change for the better or for the worse?⁷ In short what is the relationship between (a) rules, (b) the constituency they regulate, (c) the recourse to means that are not sanctioned by rules, and (d) the resultant impact on rules?

These questions are of some significance for the country, for as even a casual glance at India’s political history over the last five and a half decades shows us; the most important political battles in our society have been waged in an extra-institutional space, or outside existing rules. Do these struggles reflect the alienation of ordinary people from the rules that govern collective life? Do they reveal a lack of confidence in the ability of rules to regulate collective life in the country? But politics that takes place in a space outside rules and shared understandings can easily slide into undesirable and disastrous directions. It is perhaps time that we begin to, theoretically and politically, foreground the role of political institutions in the collective life of the country. It is perhaps time that we focus upon the capacity of institutions to regulate the conflict that stalks the project of living together. It is also perhaps time that we start taking the phenomenon of political battles outside the constraints of rules seriously.

The objective of this project is to put together, document and analyse the empirical database that we will build up in the course of the research. This will be used to develop a sustained and grounded analysis of conflict and institutional change in India. We hope that the findings of focused and rigorous research on the issue will lead to a comprehensive and a more adequate understanding of the inter-links between the rules that govern the project of collective life and the eruption of, the trajectory of, the course of, and the impact of violent conflict. Deepened understanding of the reasons that lead to

⁶ R.Friedland and R.Alford (1991) ‘Bringing Society Back in: Symbols, Practices and Institutional Contradictions’ in W.W Powell and P.J Di Maggio edited *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press), pp 232-363, in pg 256.

⁷ ‘Better’ or ‘worse’ are of course evaluative categories, which we link to the normative desirability of deepening of democracy and the expansion of individual choices.

the eruption of violence in societies like India, and a study of the impact of violence upon institutions in the country, may be of some value for scholars, political practitioners, and policy makers. It may aid interventions that seek to strengthen institutions in the country, and help in the avoidance of violent eruptions that damage the fabric of democracy. It may also help to shed light on the kinds of political intervention, which may prove effective in such situations. Finally, by building a substantial database that permits comparison between cases of conflict, and by mapping out the differing patterns of relationship between institutions and conflict, we hope to elucidate answers to the question posed by the crisis state programme. The project's targets groups include scholars, human rights organisations, political activists, government officials, and donor agencies, which support efforts to improve the conditions of people caught up in conflict situations.

II

Relationship of the Project to Existing Research on Conflict

Much theoretical energy has been spent on sorting out the reasons for the violence that has overtaken both states and civil societies in many parts of the developing world. Whatever be the nature of the conflict that has overset many societies in the world today, theorists tend to agree that violence is not irrational or an aberration that departs from the rationality of politics. Violent conflict can be purely rational waged for self-serving ends. Moreover, ethnicity, which had during the days of modernization theory been viewed as irrational and atavistic, is increasingly held responsible for the most inflexible of civil wars today. The ethnic factor, in most studies, does not only supervene onto struggles waged for material reasons, it is often interpreted as an autonomous causal variable. Civil wars over the developing world, whether India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Rwanda or Burundi, have been interpreted as not only wars over material redistribution, but also for the recognition of or the validation of ethnic identity. Therefore it is not surprising that most scholarly works today attempt to explain the phenomenon of what has been generically termed the 'global ethnic explosion' and the new climate of civil violence, in terms of ethnicity.

In general the following theoretical models have been put forth in this particular context.

- **Ethnicity as an Autonomous Variable**

Much of social science research on conflict sees ethnic identity as an independent and causal factor in the eruption of violent conflict. Theorists of this persuasion hold that collective ethnic identities are important for individuals, since these identities hand down historically shaped and shared meaning systems to members of the group. This gives to the members of the said community an identity; it gives to them a theoretical address. For shared meaning systems- memory, language, religion, and mythology- not only tell individuals who they are and where they have come from in history. Shared meanings tell the members how they have to behave towards those who belong and towards those who do not belong. They provide both identity and identification with a community.

There is, however, a flip side to this 'telling'. Since ethnic identity is based on strong notions of belonging and exclusion, inevitably members of other communities are not only seen as the outsider, they are often constructed as the 'other', or even as the 'enemy' against which the identity of the said community is forged. Ethnic wars are often about

the definition of one community against another community with whom there can be no prospect of resolution⁸.

Note that within this theoretical frame, ethnic or cultural identity is seen as a given, as a primordial, affective tie, which flows from birth into an ascriptive community, whether that community be religious or linguistic or racial, or based on caste. Correspondingly society is viewed as a conglomerate of ethnic groups, which are divided and polarised along the axis of identity. If this is so, then violence among communities can be explained as a perfectly natural phenomenon. No one has made this point more forcefully than Samuel Huntington, for whom 'culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest are civilizational identities are shaping patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world'⁹. For scholars in this *genre* of thought, given ethnic differences create and consolidate natural battle lines that lead to inter-group tensions and often warfare. Ethnic wars are simply a natural consequence of the fact that in a society we confront the phenomenon of 'we-ism' versus 'they-ism'.

▪ **Ethnicity as an Instrument of Political Mobilisation**

A second strand of the theoretical focus on ethnicity views ethnicity as an instrument, or as a cloak that conceals what at the bottom are essentially political and economic battles¹⁰. Or that ethnicity is mobilised for the purpose of waging a struggle for material resources or for political power. Identities are often constructed and evoked to wage this struggle simply because shared meanings and shared historical understanding make the task of political mobilisation easier.

Scholars belonging to this school believe that identity is not a given, but that it is constructed by cultural entrepreneurs, who use the ethnic card to gain access to economic and political resources. Ethnic identity in this *genre* of thinking is regarded as a social construct, constituted and employed in order to achieve certain goals. This explanation has been buttressed by the fact that many of the current conflicts in the world, which may actually be over material or political resources, are fought in the name of ethnic identity. For instance, few recollect that the conflict between the Tamils and the Sinhala in Sri Lanka, originated as a battle for jobs and educational opportunities, which were denied to those who spoke Tamil. The invocation of Tamil or Sinhala identity was for purely material reasons initially, whatever be the trajectory that the violence in the country has taken later.

▪ **The Political Use of Ethnic Identities**

Some theorists attempt to bring together the two notions of ethnic identity as *given*, and ethnic identity as *constructed*. Though identities are malleable and often constructed, they must *exist* in order for political mobilisation to take place. Tambiah for instance is of the view that 'ethnic identity unites the semantics of primordial and historical claims with the pragmatics of calculated choice and opportunities in dynamic contexts of political and

⁸ See for instance Anthony B. Smith (2000) 'Theories of Nationalism and Alienation. Models of Nation Formation' in Michael Leifer edited *Asian Nationalism* (London. Routledge) pp 1-20.

⁹ Samuel Huntington (1997) *Clash of Civilizations* pg 20.

¹⁰ On this see Ted R. Gurr and Barbara Haff (1994) *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics* (Boulder. C.O. Westview), Donald L. Horowitz (2001) *The Deadly Ethnic Riot* (Delhi, Oxford), *ibid* (1985) *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, University of California Press), and Paul Brass (1991) *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparisons* (Delhi, Sage),

economic competition between interest groups'¹¹. Affective ties and political interests combine and work together to some effect and create explosive situations. And this is true to a large extent. For politics in the ethnic mode, which stresses differences and incommensurability and evades commonalities, and which focuses upon certain sentiments to the exclusion of others in order to construct subjects of action, can envisage some prospect of success, only if it can tap some kind of attachment, howsoever intangible, howsoever unarticulated this may be¹².

However, despite the understanding provided by these explanations of identity, we will have to treat ethnicity as a causal factor in conflict with a considerable amount of care. Firstly no group is homogeneous and a fair amount of stratification exists within groups. Not all members of the group participate in the violence that is evoked in their name. Neither do all of them share in perceptions of historical injustices. In sum rarely do ethnic groups speak in one voice. The ethnic factor, in other words, suffers from the very drawbacks that class analysis has been accused of. It is seldom therefore that we can trace an unambiguous and direct relationship between ethnicity, the construction of ethnic identity, and violence, or between the frustrations of a group and the use of violence as a response. Arguably ethnic identity is transformed into an explosive political tool, only when the country is already in the throes of a deeper and structural crisis, which affects institutions and political organizations in a society. Secondly, it is unclear whether identification with an ethnic group is a *precondition* for conflict, or whether it is a *product* of conflict. Often ethnic identities are constructed and hardened in response to battles that are waged for other reasons. Often the leaders of the struggle legitimise themselves and the struggle by invoking the ethnic principle.

- **Greed and Grievance**

The argument that people take up violent armed struggle because they want ownership or control over material resources, or because they wallow in the politics of complaint, has been recently given a new cast. The cast is that of 'grievance and greed'. Two scholars in a paper written for the World Bank have argued that two explanatory models can be employed to elucidate the reasons for violent conflict. The first model is that of 'justice seeking wars'. In this case groups utilise violent means to end perceived injustice, which leads to an accumulation of grievances. The members of such groups can be termed 'rebels with a cause'.

The second model is based upon greed, or an acquisitive desire to control resources or share in them. An abundance of natural resources propels conflict over the ownership of these resources. Regarding the share of primary commodities in the exports of a country as a proxy for natural resources, the author's model civil wars over natural resources as 'loot seeking wars' or 'large-scale banditry'. The conclusions of the study are rather interesting. Whereas it is more difficult, suggest Collier and Hoeffler, to mobilise people to fight for justice, because justice being a collective good attracts free riders, it is easier to mobilise people to fight for control of material resources. The opportunity costs in the former case are high, but in the latter case they are manageable. Greed in sum is a far stronger motivation because the payoffs are high and outweigh the costs, compared to the politics of grievance where the end, which is justice, is a public and indivisible good. Of

¹¹ Stanley Tambiah (1996) *Leveling Crowds. Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia*. (Delhi, Vistaar

¹² Neera Chandhoke (1999) *Beyond Secularism: The Rights of Religious Minorities*, (Delhi OUP) chapter 7.

course, both these motives can be involved in a conflict situation, and motives may shift from one to another as generally happens during the course of conflict¹³.

The ‘greed versus grievance’ dichotomy is a useful one, but it is perhaps not enough to explain violent conflict, simply because it lacks an institutional dimension. Group struggles over either historically constructed grievances or greed is common to most countries. And yet not all countries witness the kind of civil war that has erupted in some societies. *Is this because some societies are able to manage political complaints that arise out of greed as well as grievances through historically shaped and sanctioned rules?* For rules can direct acquisitive instincts, provide avenues for articulation of demands, offer incentives, fashion opportunity costs, deliver justice, pose constraints, and in general offer a framework where demands can be addressed. *Conversely can we hypothesise that conflict emerges as violence when institutions fail to deal with the demands that are made on them?*

Can we, in other terms, assume that ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ as motives for violent revolt become politically relevant only in particular institutional contexts? For instance, if the organisations of the state are perceived as heavily biased when it comes to public spending on groups, if they prove susceptible to political manipulation, if they fail to respond to demands, if they are constantly subverted by political elites, or if they fail to evolve mechanisms of conflict resolution, do they cease to hold relevance for groups? Do political battles then tend to overspill the constraints laid down by rules. Perhaps yes, for are not societies that are prone to violent conflict, precisely those societies in which rules have ceased to command shared allegiance? Correspondingly, is crisis a cause of, or a consequence of conflict? Can we then assume that violent conflict is unlikely to take place if a country is committed to a framework of rules that command allegiance?

For these reasons, this project attempts to go beyond popular but single point explanations of conflict as based on primal passions aroused by ethnic identities or sub-nationalist fervour. We argue that though conflict may possess an ethnic dimension, this dimension can only be understood in relation to a *referral, the referral being institutions*. We accordingly subscribe to the proposition that any explanation of conflict, or any explanation of how conflict situations have been negotiated, has to foreground both the role and capacities of institutions, and the impact of conflict on institutions and organizations. This is simply because institutions and organisations are central to collective life. This project therefore seeks to foreground (a) the causal relationship between institutions and conflict, (b) the impact of conflict on institutions and (c) examine why similar cases have borne different outcomes. This will be done through an investigation of four case studies.

III

Major Research Questions

The major research questions that this project asks are the following

- **Tracing Causal Relationships: what are the patterns of relationship that we can trace between institutions and conflict?**
- **Impact: what are the ways in which conflict has an impact on institutions?**
- **Evaluation: How do we evaluate changes in institutions?**

¹³ Paul Collier and Anke Hoefler (2001) ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’ manuscript World Bank <http://worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/greed> and grievance.htm.

- **Comparison: Is it possible through a comparative study to arrive at certain generalisations on why certain conflicts can be contained and why others escape containment?**

Within these four broad research questions we ask the following questions.

The Nature of the Conflict.

- Why and when do political actors opt for the use of violence? The answer to this question will necessarily involve an exploration of the historical genesis of, the trajectory of, the *nature* of the conflict and the relationship between institutions and conflict.
- What bearing does the *nature* of the conflict have upon the prospects of its resolution?
- When and how do new organisations, the army, civil liberty organisations, or humanitarian NGOs, emerge as significant actors on the political scene?
- What impact does the emergence of new organisations have on existing ones?
- What are the processes by which the political system returns to ‘normalcy’ after the violence has been negotiated?
- What is the net impact of violent conflicts on organisations and on institutions? In what ways do rules change for the better or for the worse once they have been confronted by violent challenges?¹⁴
- What are implications of conflict for legitimacy of organisations and the legitimacy rules within which they function?

Comparative Analysis

- Which of the four conflicts that will be taken up for study have been addressed successfully?
- Which of these conflicts have eluded any kind of success?
- What are the mix of strategies have been employed to defuse conflicts?

Note By a mix of strategies we mean:

- Strategies of coercion.
- Strategies of persuasion.
- Offers of incentives.
- Concessions to demands.
- Civil society initiatives such as the role of civil liberty organisations, concerned citizens groups, and the media.
- Judicial interventions.
- Mediations by international human rights and humanitarian NGOs.
- Bilateral negotiations with other governments on the issue.
- What are the reasons why some strategies or a mix of strategies have succeeded in some cases?
- Why has a particular strategy/ mix of strategies failed in others?
- Can we learn from cases where a strategy/mix of strategies has been employed successfully to negotiate and defuse conflicts¹⁵? More importantly, what are the

¹⁴ We assume that when the state marshals coercive resources to suppress conflict, this has an irreversible impact on the nature of the state itself.

¹⁵ ‘Employed Successfully’ is of course as we realise a relative term. Success can only be gauged in relation to other conflict situations, which may prove to be more inflexible. We also recognise that every ‘success’ carries tremendous costs in terms of loss of human lives, breakdown or at least the distortion of

reasons for the difference in outcomes? To phrase this point differently, are the lessons that can be learnt from these success stories generalisable? Or is each case specific because it is historically contextual and contingent? In sum comparisons between different experiences of violence, and the different outcomes of violent conflict, may prove a profitable area of comparative research.

- Finally, what is the capacity of institutions and organisations in the country to address and resolve obdurate problems? Are they amenable to innovation, adaptation, and modification when confronted by intractable challenges?

IV

A Statement on the Project

The objectives of the Crisis States Programme are to:

- provide new understandings of the causes of crisis and breakdown in the developing world.
- provide understandings of the processes of avoiding or overcoming them.
- to inquire into the following question: why have some political systems and communities in 'fragile' states found in many of the low and middle-income countries broken down even to the point of violent conflict, while others have not? Why do some systems survive and reform in the face of crisis, while others experience a radical escalation of violence and conflict?

The CSP inescapably involves comparisons between and across countries and societies in the developing world. However rather than embark on a comparison between different countries and societies, we intend to compare experiences of conflict and conflict resolution in different regions in India. This is perhaps a logical research move for several reasons.

- Firstly India, in comparison to most other countries in the developing world, is a large and complex society. More importantly, Indian society is constituted by heterogeneous, hierarchical, oppressive and exploitative social structures, which provide ready cause for the outburst of violent conflict. Unequal social and economic development across regions, the co-existence of extreme poverty with affluence, and the overlap between economic and social oppression and ethnic identities, have intensified a host of tensions. These tensions often flare up into violent clashes as groups in civil society resort to the use of brute force to make their point. Even as state authorities gear up military and para-military forces to deal with the situation, tensions are further intensified. Any resolution of the problem is thus infinitely deferred. Alternatively groups in civil society resort to

institutions, and collapse of collective modes of living. And that every conflict leaves its mark upon the complex of institutions that embody the rules regulating collective existence is undeniable. Conflict stamps in other words institutions inexorably with its 'cloven hoof'. We are also of the view that in certain situations violence is a perfectly natural and legitimate way of responding to unbearable conditions, particularly when the state fails to heed the voices of its own people. But howsoever understandable the resort to violence in pursuit of political and social objectives by civil society groups may be; it is important that the use of violence should be deterred, because it subverts democracy. Institutions in a democracy should, in theory at least, be capable of addressing and redressing the politics of complaint. To grasp this point we need to discover the reasons why violence erupts periodically in societies that are considered to be established democracies such as India. Is the increasing recurrence of violence due to the subversion of organisations by political elites? Is it due to the decline of the capacity of these organisations? Or was the capacity of organizations to respond meaningfully to popular demands constrained from the beginning?

- violence to negotiate the brutality of everyday life: violation of civil liberties, economic deprivation, social exclusion, and denial to the minimal conditions that allow people to lead a life of dignity.
- However, conflict zones, it is important to note, are asymmetrically distributed over the country. Some regions experience continuous and low intensity conflict over long stretches of time. Some go through short-term explosions of high intensity conflict. And yet other parts of the country experience cycles of conflict even as the trajectory of violence grows, wanes, and grows again, and even as it responds to the way political organisations negotiate or fail to negotiate the problem. In some cases, conflict flares up on periodic occasions, in others it simmers below the surface of ordinary politics. And yet in other cases, violence becomes a part of the fabric of everyday politics. We witness breakdowns of social and political life in one historical time in a particular region and the renewal of this life at another time in the same region. It is this fact that *gives us reason to compare different experiences of conflict in the country*
 - More importantly, even if the causes of conflict may be the same in two cases, take social and economic deprivation of the peasantry for instance, the outcome of conflict may be different. The West Bengal government for instance managed to neutralise the Naxalite revolt in the late 1960s and early 1970s through a judicious mix of policies. But the Naxalite challenge to the government in Andhra Pradesh remains a grim problem till today. Equally whereas militancy in Punjab could be effectively neutralised by the state by the early 1990s, militancy in Kashmir still remains an intractable problem that defies every attempt to negotiate it?

The Specific Focus of the Project

Political and social life in India has been bedevilled by various kinds of struggles: over resources such as river waters, communal identities, caste discrimination, class exploitation, and displacements effected by the building of mega-developmental projects. For the purposes of this project we take up two categories of violent conflict in India as the linchpin of our exploration into the causes of, and the impact of conflict on political institutions in the country.

- **Conflict arising out of the Federal principle:** In the first category of conflict we study Punjab [1984 to 1992] and Jammu and Kashmir [1989 to the present]. In both states the demand for regional self-determination/secession has been accompanied by the massive use of violence by both parties to the conflict. Indeed the scale of violence that we have witnessed in these two states is unprecedented. It is estimated that over 25,000 people were killed in the Punjab during the period of militancy. In Kashmir about 40,000 people were killed in the first seven years after the movement had erupted into armed struggle in the 1990s. Reprisals by the army, atrocities by both the parties to the conflict, violations of civil liberties, mass and selective killings, assassinations, sabotage, hijacking of aircraft, the assassination of a Prime Minister in 1984, and the anti-Sikh riots that followed the assassination, resulted in a generalised crisis in and for the country.
- **Conflict over social and economic deprivation:** In the second category of conflict, we study the armed struggle waged by the Naxalite movement in two states: West Bengal [the late 1960s and the early 1970s] and Andhra Pradesh [1968 to the present] The Naxalite revolt refers to the struggles by the weaker

sections of society- the landless peasantry, forest dwellers, tribals, and agricultural labour- against unbearable social and economic deprivation. The use of violence by both sides to the conflict has led to an enormous loss of lives, police repression, and spiraling discontent leading in turn to intensified and state sponsored coercion.

It is true that the reasons for the eruption of massive conflict in the four case studies are both distinct and different: the demand for regional self-determination in the case of Punjab and the Kashmir valley, and the demand for social and economic justice in West Bengal and in Andhra Pradesh. Yet there may be much more in common between these two categories of conflict than can be perceived at first glance. Arguably groups in Punjab and in Kashmir took up arms against what they perceived as economic and political injustice. And the Naxalites in West Bengal and in Andhra Pradesh were demanding the right to determine their own futures.

Therefore, even as we study the distinctive and different trajectories of violence in these case studies in a historical and comparative perspective, we will focus on *two* institutions that are common to all four states, and that may have some bearing upon the eruption of conflict. The first institution is that of *property*. We will attempt to investigate the relationship between different forms of property relations and conflict. The second institution is that of the *party system*. We will pay attention to the different ways in which inter and intra-party competition led to conflict. Conversely, we will study the impact of violent conflict on these two institutions.

Note: Arguably property can be seen as an institution simply because property relations lie at the heart of the cluster of rules that regulate social and economic life in any given society. It will be instructive to investigate how changes in property relations or lack of changes thereof lead to conflict. Secondly, we see the party system as a subset of the rules that govern political life in an electoral democracy. We accordingly wish to investigate whether we can discern a link between inter and intra party competition and conflict [see appendix, chart 3].

Property

It is well known that in Punjab the Green Revolution in agriculture in the 1960s led to the consolidation of landholdings, and to the rise of a rich landed elite. The consolidation of a propertied class should have provided a measure of stability to the region. And yet within a few decades we see the onset of militancy in Punjab over demands for self-determination. Why did this happen? Is it possible to link the aspirations of the newly formed landed class to control the economic and the political future of the state, and frustration over its inability to do so? Let us elaborate this point a little. Though the Central Government invested in a big way in the agricultural revolution in the region, it failed to set up industries that could have absorbed the surplus generated in the agrarian sector. Some scholars have suggested that the Green revolution actually made sure that Punjab remained an agrarian economy. This arguably contributed to the rising discontent, simply because industrial development of the region was blocked by deliberate policies of the Central government.

It is also a fact that the big farmer class had little control over the agricultural commodities that it produced, since the Central government controlled the setting of producer prices. At the same time, the constant interference of the Central government in state politics, the arbitrary dismissal of elected state governments, and the repeated

imposition of President's rule ensured that the aspirant Punjabi elite had little access to state power. In sum, the lack of industrialisation meant that avenues for the profitable investment of agrarian surplus and job opportunities for the youth were blocked. The agrarian rich could not set the prices for the agricultural products that they generated. Nor could the proprietors of land control the political future of the state, because of constant interference in state politics by the Central Government. It is possible that this escalated discontent. We will in the course of this research attempt to see whether we can find a causal link between *transformed* property relations, *generalised* discontent and *support* for militancy.

Property relations similarly underwent a transformation in Jammu and Kashmir because the Sheikh Abdullah government carried out land reforms in the period 1948-50. Land reforms alienated land from the traditional owners of land: the Kashmiri Pandits and the Rajput landlords in the valley and in Jammu. The transference of land rights to predominantly Muslim tenant farmers should have led to further integration of the state with the rest of India. For whereas the Government of Pakistan was not committed to land reform, the Government of India was so committed. And this commitment benefited the former tenant farmers who were predominantly Muslim. The very idea, therefore, that Kashmiri's considered merger with Pakistan to be an option should have proved a non-starter. Moreover, land reforms were paralleled by major investment by the Central government in education. Thereafter, we see the consolidation of an affluent and educated Muslim elite in the valley.

However, it is also conceivable that restructuring of land holdings led to discontent in time to come. For as it happened in the case of Punjab, neither did the Central Government invest in the industrialization of the region, nor did it allow the Kashmiri people to determine their own political future. Many scholars are of the opinion that democracy was simply not given a chance to take root in Jammu and Kashmir. It is possible that as in the case of Punjab *the creation of a landed elite, which saw no prospects of its own economic or political advance in the state, fuelled dissatisfaction and restlessness*. It may be worthwhile to investigate whether this hypothesis can be borne out through research.

In sum we wish to explore the relationship between *new* forms of property relations, the *formation* of a rich landed elite, the *frustrations* of the new elite because it was not in control of its own economic and political future, and political *discontent*, leading in time to the extensive use of violence. Other questions follow. Does the creation of a new landed elite demand the creation of further avenues for the advancement of the elite? Does discontent with the lack of such opportunities fuel the rise of militant political action? Do new forms of property relations actually destabilise society instead of stabilising it? It may be instructive to explore the theoretical relationship between the *institution* of property, *class formation* that follows changes in property relations, *political militancy*, and resultant *impact* on property relations.

In West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh property relations took a different form. In the district of Naxalbari in West Bengal, the tribals, who constituted a significant segment of the population, were engaged as cultivators and agricultural labour on land, or employed in the tea gardens, forests and mines. However, they worked in highly adverse conditions. Many of them cultivated land that was taken on rent, but all of them suffered massive exploitation at the hands of the landlords. Discontent against highly inequalitarian land

holdings and deepening impoverishment coalesced into an armed uprising in the late 1960s. Whereas peasant uprisings in India are not a new phenomenon given the extremely iniquitous land system in the country, and the oppression and exploitation of the poor peasants and the tribals by landlords and moneylenders, the eruption of violence in the villages of Naxalbari, Phansideva, and Kharibari in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal in March 1967 was exceptional. The movement was suppressed fairly quickly through massive police repression. However the idea of Naxalbari was to prompt the Naxalite movement in different parts of the country.

In Andhra Pradesh for instance, peasants had been resisting the deeply inegalitarian rural order for decades. In the late 1960s the struggle was given a new cast, that of the Naxalite movement, which was initiated in Srikakulam. Conditions in the region were as a matter of fact ripe for armed struggle. The inhabitants of the region, who are predominantly forest dwellers, were greatly oppressed by the moneylenders and by the landlords. The tribals in the region were to simultaneously see the alienation of communally owned land and transfer of this land to private proprietors. In time the forest dwellers and the tribals mobilized to assert their rights to cultivate waste lands and use forest produce, and to demand increases in the wages of farm and daily wage workers, reduction of the share of the landowner in lands cultivated on the basis of share cropping, reduction of interest on loans, transfer of lands to their rightful owners, and ending of harassment by the police. By 1968 the movement had been transformed into an armed struggle. The movement continues till today, fighting social and economic injustice, despite the immense coercion that has been launched by the paramilitary forces of the state government.

The link between iniquitous property relations and the eruption of conflict is more than obvious in the case of West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh. Therefore, we intend to explore the relationship between conflict and institutional change in these two states. Did *conflict lead to a change in property relations* in the two states, and did these changes influence the course of the armed struggle? In the case of Punjab and the Kashmir valley on the other hand, we will try to see whether we can trace a *causal relationship between new property relations and the outbreak of conflict*

Party System

The second institution we wish to focus on in this project is the party system in India. It is generally assumed that inter-party competition for power intensifies discord, even as parties in the pursuit for power divide and polarise society. We specifically wish to investigate *whether a causal relationship can be established between inter-party and intra-party competition and the eruption of violent conflict*. For this purpose, we will explore the working of the party system in two distinct contexts.

- The first context is that of **federalism** We wish to see how the tensions between the party in power in the Central government, and the party in power in state governments, were played out in Punjab and in Jammu and Kashmir. It is well known that in both states the party in power at the Centre, notably the Congress party, not only interfered in state politics, it repeatedly attempted to destabilise state governments. This was in complete violation of the basic principles of federalism that is state autonomy. And this in turn was to generate tremendous discontent in the two states. Secondly, most political observers are of the opinion that democracy was simply not given a chance to work in particularly the Kashmir valley because political parties in power at the Centre sought to

monopolise power. To what extent did this contribute to the *escalation* of discontent? Did discontent lead to some *modification* in federalism and in the party system? What was the *impact* of the conflict on the twin principles of Indian democracy-federalism and competitive party politics?

This however is not the complete story, and further questions need to be asked of the party system. For instance, what was and what is the attitude of the state-level parties- the Akali Dal and the Congress in Punjab, and the National Conference and the Congress in Jammu and Kashmir- to the militancy and to the leaders of the militant movement? Why is it that in both states armed struggle took the extra-institutional road, rejecting parliamentary party politics in the process?

- The second context is that of *radical party politics*. Arguably after both the Communist parties in the country-the Communist Party of India and the Communist Party in India Marxist-took to the parliamentary path, their capacity to represent radical challenges to the political system diminished greatly. In West Bengal and in Andhra Pradesh the Communist parties were unable to come to grips with, or more importantly unable to articulate the deprivation and the discontent of the peasantry and of the tribals. The formation of Communist Party of India Marxist Leninist [CPML or the Naxalite party] in both states challenged the credentials of the two mainstream communist parties to represent the marginalized as well as to substantively address the malaise.

The question we wish to investigate in this connection is the following: why did the CPML have to resort to *extra-parliamentary politics* or armed struggle to resolve issues? To what extent was the party system incapable of articulating and negotiating the demands of the deprived sections of the peasantry? What is the causal relationship that we can establish between the *inability* of the party system to address social and economic grievances, the *eruption* of armed struggle, and the rise of a *new* party/movement representing a new ideology and a new strategy? Did the outbreak of violence lead to the *systemic* transformation of the two Left Parties? What is the *relationship* of the two communist parties, the CPI and the CPIM on the one hand, and the CPIML on the other? What was the *impact* of armed struggle and of the coercion launched by the state authorities on the functioning of the CPML? How does all this *affect the party system* in India?

We do not believe that conflict was caused *only* because of property relations or *only* because of the inability of the left and other parties to address substantial grievances. However, we are of the opinion that it would be worthwhile to explore whether these two institutions can be accorded a *central* place in the complex of reasons that led to the outbreak of violent conflict. It may be equally significant to study the impact of conflict on property relations and on the party system, since both these institutions are crucial to the functioning of liberal democracy in India.

The Comparative Dimension

An exploration of patterns of causal relationships between conflict and institutions forms the first objective of the proposed research. Secondly, we will attempt to study the four cases that we have identified in a comparative perspective. It is of some interest to note that within each of these two categories, whereas one case of conflict has been negotiated successfully, the other continues to defy any kind of resolution. In Punjab a mix of strategies has resulted in defusing the tension that prevailed in the region for much of the

1980s and the early 1990s. In Kashmir however all attempts to resolve the problem have been constantly bedevilled by rising hostility and increasing violence. Why is this so? Is it because no generalisation is possible since each case of conflict is historically specific? When we come to the second category of conflict, we find that whereas the Naxalite movement died down in West Bengal by the turn of the 1970s, the Naxalite movement in Andhra Pradesh continues to evade negotiations. How did the West Bengal Government manage to contain conflict and why has the Andhra Pradesh government failed to do so? Does the difference lie in the strategies that are employed to contain conflict? Or does the difference lie elsewhere? In the success or the failure of the state governments to address substantive demands for instance? [See appendix, chart 4]

Summing up

Institutionalists theorise institutions as clusters of rules that embody formal procedures, as well as informal rules that systematise the shared understandings of a given society. Historical institutionalists distinguish themselves from rational choice institutionalists on the ground that political actors enact their scripts not in complete independence from, but within a specific context of rules, regulations, and understandings. Important battles over interests, ideas, and power, are fought in and through institutions¹⁶. Within this theoretical framework we seek to understand the complex and contradictory relationship between institutions and conflict. Or we seek to uncover patterns of causal relationships between institutions and conflict. This does not mean that other factors are not important in the understanding of conflict. It merely means that these factors should be understood in a relational manner and within the context provided by institutions.

¹⁶ Among the important works of historical institutionalists are: Sidney Tarrow (1998) *Power in Movements. Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), Paul Pierson (1994) *Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment* (Cambridge, CUP), Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier (1991) *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labour Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (NJ, Princeton University Press), Theda Skocpol (1979) *States and Social Revolutions. A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), and Alexander Gerschenkron (1962) *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press)

APPENDIX
Chart 1. Objectives of the Project




CHART 2 Research Questions




CHART 3 Property and the Party System

Institution	Punjab	Jammu and Kashmir	West Bengal	Andhra Pradesh
Property Relations	Altered by the Green Revolution	Transformed by Land Reform	Iniquitous Land Holdings	Alienation of communally owned land and skewed patterns of land distribution
Political Parties	The Federal Context	The Federal Context	The context of radical politics	The context of radical politics
Relationship between institutions and conflict	Subject of inquiry	Subject of inquiry	Subject of inquiry	Subject of inquiry

CHART 4 Comparing Outcomes

Category	Successful Outcome	Unsuccessful Outcome	Subject of Inquiry
Secession-Punjab, Kashmir	Punjab	Kashmir	How can we explain differences in outcomes?
Armed Struggle in the state	West Bengal	Andhra Pradesh	How can we explain differences in outcomes?

PART TWO

Research Design

This research work is organised to produce an informed and substantive analysis of the relationship between conflict and institutional life in the country. We hope to arrive at such understanding by conducting research in the four states identified above.

- Within each of these states we will identify *two survey* constituencies for the purpose of administering questionnaires to the inhabitants of the area. We will identify those areas that have witnessed intense violence in order to elucidate the subjective dimension of the issue at hand.
- After we have analysed the data on the survey constituencies of the four states in particular and on the states in general, we will carry out a systematic cross-state, cross-category, and intra-category comparison of the data that has been generated.
- The cross state comparison between four states, between eight survey constituencies, and within eight survey constituencies, will help us to identify the different ways in which the causal relationship between institutions and conflict is played out.

Plan of Work

The First Phase of the Research- 1st September 2003 to 31st December 2003.

Documentation

In the first phase of the research we will concentrate on the first two of the case studies: Punjab and Kashmir.

- 1.1 We plan to collect and review literature on the political biography of conflict in these two states, and on identifying and filling in the gaps in the available literature. We hope to document the history of the conflict in the two cases, through the perusal of archival material, government white papers, microfilms of newspapers and other reports, visual sociology such as documentary films, and secondary material in the form of publications in scholarly journals.
- 1.2 We will interview selected government and police officials who have been involved in the conflict, civil liberty activists, political activists, documentary film makers, and members of various commissions which have been set up for the purposes of negotiations.
- 1.3 Using the help of a professional geographical information society, we hope to map out the course of the conflict. This will aid us in identifying two districts each in Punjab and Kashmir, which have witnessed heightened militancy as well as army action. We plan to carry out indepth studies of the areas in each of the four districts in terms of
 - The spatial, the demographic and the social composition of the inhabitants of the area,
 - the occupational structure of the area,
 - the economic profile of the area in terms of public spending by the government, investments by the government, and provision of social services such as health, education, employment, and welfare
 - grants given by the government to compensate the victims of violence,
 - the political beliefs of the inhabitants.

Political, social and economic profiles of the areas will be constructed using primary material such as planning commission reports as well as data collected during field research, such as reports of the district administration and of local self government bodies, i.e., panchayats.

- 1.4 We will use the help of a professional statistician to draw up a structured questionnaire, which will focus on how the inhabitants of our constituency perceive militancy, institutions, and the relationship between the two.
- 1.5 In October 2003 we will hold a brainstorming session at the DCRC. We plan to invite selected scholars from Delhi and from outside, so that they can give their informed responses to the project proposal
- 1.6 By the end of December 2003 we plan to give a seminar on a review of literature on the first two of our case studies, Punjab and Kashmir, in the DCRC.

Second Phase of the Research 1st January 2004- 31st March 2004

- 1.1. The research team will continue to gather material on the subject
- 1.2 The four members of the research team as well as the two directors will visit each of the four constituencies that have been selected to administer the survey questionnaires that have been drawn up. We will have to first investigate the social composition of the inhabitants of the selected constituency in order to decide whether we can use the method of random survey, or whether we may need to target representative sections of the population on the criterion of income, religion, gender, and caste.
- 1.3 The team will gather data from the field, which will help us to build up our profiles of the region.
- 1.4 We hope to interview members of the militant movement in the two states in order to secure their perceptions on the relationship between conflict and institutions.
- 1.5 Placement of preliminary findings on the web site of the DCRC.

Third Phase of the Research 1st April 2004- 31st August 2004

In the third phase of the research we will concentrate on the third and fourth of our case studies: West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh. At the same time members of our research team will continue to expand collection of data on Punjab and Kashmir and undertake field trips to the two states to verify data already collected.

- 1.1 We plan to review literature on the political biography of the Naxalite movement in these two states, and on identifying and filling in the gaps in the available literature. We plan to document the history of the movement in the two states using archival material, government white papers, micro-films of newspapers, visual sociology such as documentary films, and secondary material in the form of publications in scholarly journals.
- 1.2 We will interview members of the movement government, administrators, and police officials who have been involved in negotiating the movement, civil liberty groups, citizen groups in Andhra Pradesh, political activists, documentary film makers, and members of various commissions which have been set up for the purposes of negotiations.
- 1.3 Using the help of a professional geographical information society, we hope to map out the course of the armed struggle in the two states. This will aid us in identifying

two districts each in West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh, which have witnessed heightened armed struggle as well as army action.

We plan to carry out indepth studies of the areas in each of the four districts in terms of

- The spatial, the demographic and the social composition of the inhabitants of the area.
- The occupational structure of the region.
- The economic profile of the region in terms of public spending, and investments by the government, provision of social services such as health, education, employment, and welfare
- The grants given by the government to compensate the victims of violence,
- The political beliefs of the inhabitants of the selected area.

1.4 A political, social and economic profile of the state in general and the selected areas in particular will be constructed using primary material such as planning commission reports as well as data collected from the field, such as reports of the district administration and of local self government bodies, i.e., panchayats.

1.5 We will use the help of the professional statistician to draw up a structured questionnaire, which will focus on how the inhabitants of our constituency perceive the armed struggle as well as state action. We consider this is important because the people in the affected areas should be in a good position to chart out the link between violent conflict and the responses of the state. This will add to the value of the findings of the research project by adding a subjective dimension.

1.6 Presentation on preliminary findings on the two states in DCRC in August 2004

1.7 Placement of a research paper on the findings on the CSP website in August 2004.

Fifth Phase of the Research September 2004- December 2004

1.1. The research team will continue to gather documentary material on the subject

1.2 Members of the research team as well as the two directors will visit each of the four constituencies that have been selected to administer the survey questionnaire. We will have to first investigate the social composition of the inhabitants of the selected constituency in order to decide whether we can use the method of random survey, or whether we may need to target representative sections of the population on the criterion of income, religion, gender, and caste.

1.3 In October we should be able to present two research papers at forums of Delhi University, Jawaharlal Nehru University, and other intellectual bodies such as the India International Centre and the Habitat Centre.

1.4 Publication of research papers in journals such as Economic and Political Weekly and national newspapers such as The Hindu

1.5 Placement of the research papers on the DCRC/CSP website

1.6 In December 2004 we will present the findings of the research project at the annual meeting of the crisis states programme in Delhi.

Sixth Phase of the Research: January 2005-March 2005

1.1 Data analysis using the help of a professional statistician.

- 1.2 Revisiting the field in the four states to verify data already collected and collect new data if any.
- 1.3 Writing up research findings in a lengthy paper to be sent to an international journal for publication

Seventh Phase of the Project: April 2005-August 2005.

- 1.1 Holding of a National workshop in April 2005 to present the findings of the research project
- 1.2 Finalising the writing up of research findings in light of the comments of the workshop and dissemination of the research findings.
- 1.3 Systematic cross-state comparison of the four case studies.
- 1.4 Geographical mapping of the findings of the research project.
- 1.5 Visual Sociology, or the preparation of a documentary on our research
- 1.6 Presentation of the final report at the final meeting of the Crisis States programme in August 2005 in London
- 1.7 Finalising a book length manuscript for publication.

PLAN OF WORK

First Phase: Sept-Dec 2003	Second Phase: Jan-March 2004	Third phase: April-August 2004	Fourth Phase: Sept-Dec 2004	Fifth Phase Jan-March 2005	Sixth Phase: April-Aug 2005
Documentation on Punjab and Kashmir, interviews, holding of a workshop of experts in October, preparation of Questionnaire, identification of survey constituencies, Presentation at DCRC in December 2003	Field work in selected constituencies of Punjab and Kashmir, placement of preliminary findings on the web site of the DCRC.	Documentation on West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh, interviews, preparation of questionnaire, identification of survey constituencies. Presentation on a survey of literature paper at DCRC in August and placement on CSP website.	Field work in selected constituencies in West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh. Finalisation of two research papers to be presented in various academic forums in Delhi in August, publication in journals such as Economic and Political Weekly, and national newspapers such as the Hindu, presentation of research findings at the annual meeting of the CSP in Delhi	Data Analysis, revisiting the field, writing up the findings	Finalising the writing up of the findings of the research project, systematic cross state comparison, geographical mapping, visual sociology, holding of a national seminar in April 2005, finalising the report, dissemination, presentation of a final report at the annual meeting of the CSP, and preparation of a book length manuscript.

PLAN OF SEMINARS AND PUBLICATIONS

December 2003	Seminar DCRC	Review of literature on Punjab and Kashmir
January 2004	Publications	CSP Working Paper based on literature review
March 2004	Placement on the Web site	Placement of preliminary findings of field trips to Punjab and Kashmir on the website of DCRC and CSP.
August 2004	Seminar/placement on web site	Review of literature on West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh in DCRC. Placement of a Working Paper on research findings on CSP web site.
October 2004	Seminar	Two research papers to be presented in various academic and other forums
November 2004	Publications	Two research papers to be sent to academic journals and daily newspapers for publication.
November 2004	Publications/ Placement on Website	Placement of these two research papers as Working Papers on the websites of DCRC and CSP
December 2004	Seminar	Presentation of research findings at the annual workshop of CSP in Delhi
March 2005	Publication	Writing up research findings for a paper to be published in an international journal
April 2005	National workshop	National workshop on findings of the research project
May- June	Dissemination of research findings.	Finalising the report in light of the comments of the participants of the National workshop and dissemination to scholars, policy planners, NGOs, and donor agencies.
August 2005	Seminar	Presentation of the report of the project to the final workshop of crisis states.
August 2005-December 2005	Preparation of a manuscript	Finalising a book length manuscript for publication.