

The Social Construction of Militant Sanctuary

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At a speech at the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) on October 2nd, 2009, General Stanley McChrystal, Commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, encouraged an audience of listeners to question “generally accepted, bumper sticker truths” about the country and the war being fought there.¹ McChrystal’s comments came a week after journalist David Martin profiled him on the US weekly news show 60 Minutes, and several weeks into a vigorous public campaign by McChrystal to drum up support for a resource-intensive counterinsurgency campaign then still awaiting White House approval. In his introductory IISS remarks, McChrystal offered barbed criticism of a proposed plan to abandon Afghanistan – “Chaos-istan” – that would let it degenerate into a “Somalia-style haven of chaos” to be contained but not occupied. The remark was a curious one: for eight years, Afghanistan had been the referent of choice for all discussions and debates on the subject of safe havens. Holding aloft another state in this way, however casually, hardly broke the archetypal mold, since there have been many exemplars to choose from over the years – Somalia, to be sure, but also Iraq, the Philippines, and others. But relying as it did – ironically – on its own set of bumper sticker truths, it does suggest some of the incoherence and limitations of the debate on safe havens.

There is a robust literature on safe havens, but its pages tile the mosaic of international security unevenly, such that the inquisitive mind is left with only partial sight of the problem. It is, at once, the most important form of support that a state can provide to its armed surrogates,² a prerogative of the intervening humanitarian enterprise designed to shelter civilians in war,³ and an adapted form of strategic depth - a protected base area - from which guerrilla movements spring forth to do battle with the Goliath.⁴ It is, too, an electric realm of data diodes and digital death, catalytic architectures infused with social meaning,⁵ and sacred sites that metabolize human violence and divine will.⁶ It is, above all, an occult geography that competes in the imagination with the fate of truths preferred by realist soldiers and statesmen: states are immutable facts of international relations, and safe havens are their illegitimate offspring. Telescopic views of the secret life of war rarely reveal the whole truth of the matter. "Observed from a distance," Peter Beaumont writes, "war is defined by its most visible phenomena - the killing, destruction and displacement. They are solid things, assessable through numbers, statistic and dates - even the bald two-line report describing how [a soldier] died," the details of which "are boringly, intentionally prosaic, skulking around the edges of his death."⁷

Such details, Beaumont argues, "represent the aspect of conflict it is possible easily to map through its battles and altering front lines, the war of press conferences, statements and newspaper reports. But," he continues, "conflict has another quality that exists at the margins of observable violence. A hinterland electric with words and stories, with the telling and retelling that enfolds war's central facts, it is this periphery that gives to conflict its real, deep and resonant meaning."⁸ In this paper I argue that Beaumont's war of press conferences,

statements and newspaper reports has demonstrated a marked preoccupation with militant phenomena in Afghanistan and Iraq observed almost exclusively from a distance.

Drawing on press releases, commission reports, congressional testimony, investigative journalism, and participant observation, I explore official discourses on terrorist safe havens that illustrate much concern and substance but little coherence, generated largely from within Washington's political elite and associated advisory/punditry circles. "Distance" is, in this sense, a relative term, characterizing multiple sanctuary-related ontologies of threat and vulnerability. My principal concern is that political claims to knowledge on this particular subject suffer from a pronounced form of clerisy in which both historical precedent and the discourses of militants themselves - past and present - have been largely ignored or neglected. Understanding political conjecture on the subject is therefore a critical first step towards an empirical accounting of militant sanctuary practices.

My aim with this paper is threefold: shed light on extant scholarship; establish a narrative of Washington's post-9/11 sanctuary discourse; and provide a robust justification for future research on the subject. I contest the attractive but ultimately limiting notion that geography determines ethnic and political destiny.⁹ In keeping with Weber, I take the view that militant safe havens are contingent on socially constructed meanings about the physical world. "We are cultural beings," he wrote at the turn of the 20th century, "endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance."¹⁰ Lest this approach be taken as an endorsement of the idea, to borrow from Alexander Wendt, that sanctuary is merely what states make of it, this paper presupposes that militant sanctuary practices and locations enjoy an objective reality that exists outside of the political frames used to describe them.¹¹ It also rejects a spatially deterministic, static model of sanctuary that does not generally account for changes in the disposition or quality of its human occupants. It seeks to forcefully nudge the realist national security debate on safe havens, in other words, into acknowledging the complexities of human security that shape the problem.

The Literature

Political scientist Richard Jackson has argued, "At the heart of every counter-terrorism campaign is a ubiquitous narrative of threat and danger."¹² Far from dismissing that threat as a political fabrication, the London School of Economics' Mary Kaldor notes, "it is too serious to be hijacked by fantasies of old war." The conflict formerly referred to as the "war on terror", she has argued, deliberately merged archaic notions of heroic armed struggles between states (what she terms "Old War") and a state of war readiness in which armed confrontation is subordinate to the ideological convictions that sustain it (such as the Cold War, the "war on drugs", the "war on crime", and so on). This has created a false sense of political community whose overextended militarism could, in turn, produce a condition of perpetual violence, largely bereft of redeeming purpose or regulatory mechanisms (or "New Wars"). As politically defined subsets of recent wars, terrorists and their sanctuaries have not fared any better. Oxford University's Sir Adam Roberts, for example, has criticized post-9/11 US policy for its limited sense of "previous experience of governments in tackling terrorist threats, or the ways

in which certain international wars of the twentieth century were sparked off by concerns about terrorism.”¹³

Countersanctuary strategies are specifically problematic. In 2002, Karin Von Hippel, now Co-Director of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington, D.C. think tank, noted two camps in the U.S. policy debate on denial of terrorist space. “Night Raiders” are conservative advocates of “smash and grab raids” against terrorist threats and military options against their sponsors, but prefer non-involvement in the broader domestic conditions of foreign states. “Reluctant Intervenors”, on the other hand, believe “that force will only make a difference if it is accompanied by development and humanitarian assistance,” arguing that the only effective approach to denying terrorists sanctuary “is to help restore effective government, provide adequate security sector reform, and strengthen the economy.” The two sides of the debate link the shape and character of foreign engagement to the political will for it, but specifically neglect “the enormous differences between the types of problem states.”¹⁴

Such strategies present additional concerns. “The proposition that terrorism should be attacked at source is attractive,” Roberts has observed, but notes that it is “a false choice” since engaging “the enemy at longer range... is no substitute for defensive anti-terrorist and counter-terrorist activities.” More, “the history of counter-terrorist operations suggests no simple conclusion.” Surgical counterterrorism operations have been successfully conducted, but there have also been real constraints against waging war on armed non-state actors, such as limited capability for launching long range military operations (or “force projection”), or political disinterest in engaging in open conflict with powerful state sponsors guilty of harbouring third-party militants. More importantly, Roberts notes that attempting to deny sanctuary “is a recipe for a revival of imperialism”, since military operations intended “to eliminate the sources of terrorism must inevitably mean, in many cases, exercising external domination for a period of decades.”¹⁵

Carol McQueen's study of humanitarian intervention and safety zones in the 1990s further illustrates the post-911 safe haven debate's historical impoverishment. Her survey of international humanitarian law and historical precedent (originally undertaken as a PhD project under Roberts' supervision) reveals four categories of statutory haven - hospital, neutral, non-defended and demilitarized zones - shaped by five key attributes: first, one party to a conflict may request the establishment of a safety zone, but both parties must consent; second, establishment of a safety zone precludes any military activity taking place within it; third, safety zones are predicated on a civilian protection regime; fourth, there are generally no internal security provisions; and finally, such areas are manageable in scale. In the 1990s, safety zones in Iraq (no fly zones), Bosnia (UN safe cities), and Rwanda (the French Operation Turquoise safe zone), “most closely resembled the neutralized zones envisioned by Article 15 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV or the demilitarized zones of Article 60 of the 1977 Geneva Protocol I.”¹⁶

The Iraq, Bosnia and Rwanda cases diverge from earlier forms in four ways. First, they were externally imposed, rather than established on the consent of both parties to a conflict. Second,

the civilians that the safety zones were meant to protect were not peripheral to a conflict between two parties, but in fact the principal targets of the violence. Third, because the zones were externally imposed in order to protect civilians, they were also defended (though not well). Fourth, demilitarization and continued military use of the safety zones "became issues of contention or confusion". Finally, the Iraq, Bosnia and Rwanda safety zones were much larger in area than their historical antecedents or than the law intended, "making the zones much more difficult to monitor than a hotel or hospital, and much more important strategically to the belligerents."¹⁷

The longer term implications of these findings should not be underestimated. While Clinton era "safe havens" included the occasional foray into striking terrorists at source, the liberal internationalism of the time was overwhelmingly preoccupied with the plight of civilians caught in the crossfires - or deliberately targeted - in various post-Cold War conflicts. During the post-911 Bush era, on the other hand, the Administration's neoconservative worldview, particularly after the Al Qaeda attacks on Manhattan and the Pentagon, was decidedly paranoid and unilateral. Tolerance for either diplomatic or territorial middle ground simply evaporated; the world was thought to be rife with extra-sovereign elisions, and the Bush Administration took on the herculean task of trying to manage them all. If the lessons of 1990s safety zones are any indication, this was a profound strategic gaffe: statutory havens in Iraq, Bosnia and Rwanda exceeded manageable scale; under Bush, such zones were reconceptualised to even larger state and regional dimensions. As pundit Matthew Yglesias pointed out, "You need to be wary of a strategic concept which implies that the security of American citizens requires the United States to achieve effective physical control over 100 percent of the world's land area."¹⁸

Contra McQueen's humanitarian model, others have looked to state provision of safe haven as it pertains to violations of international norms and laws against terrorism. Daniel Byman argues that "a haven is often the most important form of support that a state can provide." State *provision* of sanctuary, he argues, occurs along a spectrum of activity: "a haven may allow one or two operatives to find shelter from a hostile state after an attack or it may include allowing a group to run dozens of training camps and a massive recruitment centre."¹⁹ Militant *acquisition* of safe haven is equally contingent on a range of variables.²⁰ According to Rex Brynen, sanctuaries are essential to insurgent success, and "differ widely in terms of geography, usage, and political context." They can be internal or external to a contested state, and factors influencing insurgent use of sanctuary include its availability within a contested state, "proximity and access offered by potential external sanctuaries," popular support within internal safe havens, and the level of state support in external safe havens.²¹ Distinguishing between *provision* and *acquisition* of sanctuary suggests a range of patron-client variables between state and non-state actors, and lends itself well to a deeper exploration of militant intent and agency.

Differing organizational structures suggest likely spatial variations in sanctuary type, as well - a factor that has only been alluded to in the literature but never explored in depth. Indeed, much ink has been spilled on new forms and modes of warfare since the end of the Cold War.²² More recently, there has also been heated debate over the networked character of armed non-state

actors.²³ That variations in actor-type organization and structure might generate corresponding spatial variations in sanctuary requirements, however, has only figured peripherally in such discussions. This is a significant elision, particularly as current policy debates over counterinsurgency and counterterrorism options in Afghanistan fail to make intelligible distinctions on the matter. Put another way, ideal-type guerrilla, insurgent, terrorist and criminal organizations are often structured and resourced in distinct ways that reflect widely divergent spatial requirements. The logic is clearly extendable, therefore, to their respective sanctuary requirements.²⁴

Another emergent challenge to the primacy of state-centric sanctuary models emanates from specialists in more spatially sensitive disciplines such as geography and architecture. They see in the "politics of verticality" and latter-day urbanization of warfare the possibility of a new international relations of the built environment.²⁵ "Geopolitics is a flat discourse," writes Israeli architect and theorist Eyal Weizmann. "It largely ignores the vertical dimension and tends to look across rather than to cut through the landscape. This was the cartographic imagination inherited from the military and political spatialities of the modern state."²⁶ In this light, it is easy to see how preconceived notions of state-sanctuary relations collapse under the weight of evidence accumulated from wars fought over sacred ground. Ron Hassner, a leading scholar of religion and international relations, however, convincingly argues that post-structuralist interpretations of space are less useful in understanding "religious intelligence", particularly as it pertains to sacred sites such as churches, synagogues, mosques, temples, and so on, in times of war.²⁷

Hassner surveys the right of sanctuary in Christian, Judaic, and Muslim traditions, and locates contemporary militant sanctuary practices firmly within their respective physical architectures. Religious sanctuary tenets can and have famously shaped militant exploitation of the built environment in Iraq (Al Askariya Shrine, Samarra, 2006/2007), Pakistan (Lal Masjid mosque, Islamabad, 2007), Israel (the Church of the Nativity, Bethlehem, 2002), and India (Golden Temple, Amritsar, 1984). For security forces that have to contend directly with sieges, weapons caching or other militant exploitation of such sites, understanding the specific meanings and expectations attached to each is the difference between success or failure, negotiation or bloodshed, popular support of public backlash.²⁸ For policymakers, this "vertical" sub-layer of strategically important sanctuary sites transects more laterally minded top-level approaches to international relations. Such architectural havens, in fact, enjoy a parallel statutory existence in the codification of the international legal principles of sovereignty, extraterritoriality and asylum that underpin McQueen's humanitarian safety zones.²⁹ This is another powerful argument for a serious rethink of more linear whole-state and state-centric views of sanctuary configurations, an account of which follows this section.³⁰

Bumper Sticker Truths: The Bush Administration

"Since first invading Afghanistan nearly a decade ago," Matthew Rosenberg and Siobhann O'Gorman wrote in the *Washington Post* earlier this month, "America set one primary goal:

Eliminate al Qaeda's safe haven."³¹ Indeed, speaking from Camp David on 15 September 2001, President George W. Bush set the tone for his Administration's policies on the issue.³² As he gathered senior administration officials together to plan the nation's response to the attacks that had occurred four days earlier, the focus of their meetings was framed in terms of denying sanctuary to terrorists. "We're going to meet and deliberate and discuss," he told reporters, "but there's no question about it, this act will not stand; we will find those who did it; we will smoke them out of their holes; we will get them running and we'll bring them to justice. We will not only deal with those who dare attack America, we will deal with those who harbor them and feed them and house them." Statements by Secretary of State Colin Powell and Attorney General John Ashcroft were followed by a reporter asking Bush what he would say "to Americans who are worried that the longer it takes to retaliate, the more chance the perpetrators have to escape and hide and just escape justice?" Bush's lexicography wavered little. "They will try to hide," he replied, "they will try to avoid the United States and our allies – but we're not going to let them. They run to the hills; they find holes to get in. And we will do whatever it takes to smoke them out and get them running, and we'll get them."³³

Bush's promise to seek out terrorists where they live and "smoke them out of their holes" quickly became totemic of the Administration's approach to Al Qaeda. This particular sound bite would take on significant policy relevance: the phrase fit with the much caricatured frontier mentality of a former Texas Governor. It also acted as a salve for Americans still in shock that an enemy attack could have taken place on US soil, with such devastating consequences. The notion that foreign-based and sponsored violence had struck into the heart of America shattered the illusion that North America had always been an impenetrable refuge from the conflict and instability of the world. Bush: "Americans have known wars -- but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war -- but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks -- but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day -- and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack."³⁴

In a series of speeches and addresses, the President focused on the global and offensive nature of a coming "long war" against terrorism. "We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest," he stated. "The only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows."³⁵ A little over a week later, on the scope and focus of the US campaign against Al Qaeda: "our war on terror will be much broader than the battlefields and beachheads of the past" and "this war will be fought wherever terrorists hide, or run, or plan."³⁶ Bush was clear that Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and the Taliban would share the fates of their historical analogues: "We are not deceived by their pretences to piety. We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions -- by abandoning every value except the will to power – they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies."³⁷

The powerful Administration rhetoric that followed in the days and weeks after 9/11 expressed outrage over the attacks in often essentialist terms, a public tone that for many was strikingly reminiscent of arguments against humanitarian intervention in the early 1990s. References to “crusaders” and “barbarians” could hardly have reassured world leaders – particularly those in the Muslim world – already faced with the certainty that the global security agenda had quite literally undergone a radical overnight shift. But the demonization of foreign terrorists also contains important cues on perceptions of sanctuary. To wit, the primitive conditions in Afghanistan and the border regions of Pakistan: “We’re mounting a sustained campaign to drive the terrorists out of their hidden caves and to bring them to justice”; “slowly, but surely, we’re smoking al Qaeda out of their caves so we can bring them to justice”; and “In terms of Mr. bin Laden himself, we’ll get him running. We’ll smoke him out of his cave, and we’ll get him eventually.”³⁸

During a joint April 2002 press conference with the Norwegian Minister of Defence Kristin Krohn Devold, Bush’s caustic Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld offered the following, in response to a query from CNN’s Barbara Star about Iran:

Rumsfeld: Barbara?

Q: Well, my question could you review for us today your thinking about exactly how unhelpful you believe Iran is right now in the war on terrorism? In fact, do you now believe that al Qaeda has moved in and out of Iran, has operated in Iran? Do you believe that Iran in the current situation in Israel is continuing to back some of the unrest beyond this shipment of the arms you have spoken about? Just how unhelpful is Iran at the moment, in your mind?

Rumsfeld: There is no question but that Iran was involved with the Karine A shipment headed for the Palestinian Authority. There is no question but that al Qaeda have moved in and found sanctuary in Iran. And there is no question but that al Qaeda have moved into Iran and out of Iran to the south and dispersed to some other countries. To my knowledge, they are not operating out of Iran in the sense that they were out of Afghanistan, so there’s that distinction. But I can’t think of a thing I’ve said that anyone, by the wildest stretch of their imagination could characterize as “helpful”; they’re all harmful and contributing to the problems with respect to the global terrorists.

Q: Can I just follow up on two points? When you say they have found sanctuary in Iran, does that mean that you believe that al Qaeda is currently in Iran? And secondly, given what you have laid out, how do you begin to touch the problem inside Iran?

Rumsfeld: Maybe the word “sanctuary” was not a perfect word because I don’t think of it as a permanent sanctuary, I think of it as transit and — and — as opposed to operating out of the country. But it certainly would be helpful if they were more cooperative, and they have not been particularly. There are a couple of instances where they have characterized what they’re doing as being helpful, as I recall.³⁹

One could almost hear the wheels turning in Rumsfeld's head, pinning safe haven to notions of permanence and transience, with a slighter nod to specific functions. In this frame, a sanctuary was only really a sanctuary if it was permanent and functioned as a base for operations carried out elsewhere. The unspoken implication was that it also referred to a site of entrenchment, a foothold from which a group or organization or movement could grow and spread. Though left unsaid in this passage, it became a truism of neoconservative thinking on Islam, the Middle East, and extremism linked to both. Recent reports on the character of Rumsfeld's influence in the White House sheds additional light on the subject: allegations of Rumsfeld-approved intelligence tampering describe biblical quotes routinely adorning the covers of the President's daily *Worldwide Intelligence Update*.⁴⁰ One assumes a certain degree of religious understanding underlying the decision-making and output of many Bush Administration officials, whose faith-based approach to politics has been no secret. In speculative terms, one wonders whether in this context denying "sanctuary" - a term loaded with religious meaning, per Hassner's analysis - had particular resonance.

The conduct of subsequent counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, the Balkans, and Iraq – and the public addresses and policy statements that followed – reaffirmed the opening rhetoric of the war. The February 2003 *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* made denial of sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists its “second front” in the war on terror. The July 2004 report of the 9/11 Commission devoted significant attention to terrorist sanctuaries and the policy options available for denying them to enemy militants.⁴¹ The following month a number of government documents and hearings discussed, with varying degrees of elaboration, the Commission's key findings and recommendations on the issue. A Congressional Research Service study, *Terrorist Sanctuaries: The 9/11 Commission Recommendations and U.S. Policy*, was published on 10 August 2004. It noted that the focus on terrorist refuges had been a long-standing pillar of U.S. strategy, but that after 11 September 2001, “U.S. efforts to deny terrorists sanctuary were substantially increased worldwide.”⁴² Congressional hearings held on 6 August, 10 August, and 19 August 2004,⁴³ and subsequent public testimony on 10 March 2005,⁴⁴ elaborated the Commission's interpretation of sanctuary, and identified policy approaches and methods for tackling the perceived threat.

Bush Administration rhetoric, remarkably, has also been the subject of a public feud of sorts between the former speechwriters who crafted it. In 2007, lead speechwriter Michael J. Gerson, a Bush aide from 1999 until his resignation in 2006 as Assistant to the President for Policy and Strategic Planning, published *Heroic Conservatism*, a memoir of his time in the White House.⁴⁵ In an advance review published in the September 2007 issue of the *Atlantic Monthly*, Gerson colleague Matthew Scully excoriated the book, accusing Gerson (also noted for his evangelical commitments) of self-aggrandizement, romanticization, and outright fabrication.⁴⁶ Intellectual claim-staking over Presidential speech of the era might seem outrageous to the outside reader, not least because it was often the subject of ridicule. But for Scully, it was simply unseemly – speechwriters, he wrote, belong “off to the side, where even the best there ever was... was always content to stay.” Whatever one might think of the Bush Administration

and the color of its verbiage, the Gerson-Scully affair represented a serious attack on process. "Speechwriting is a job with many privileges," Scully concluded, "but also its own rules, temptations, and demands of conscience, obvious and nonnegotiable. The work has rewards enough without each speechwriter stepping forward to give his or her name its own permanent shine in history."⁴⁷

The 9/11 Commission further entrenched official thinking on safe havens, giving it a privileged place in the bosom of the Administration's wider evangelical mission. Its findings revolved around militant Islam, the threat of mass casualty terrorism, and the most likely geographical conditions in which terrorists could organize, plan, and train for such attacks. For the Commission, the complexity of mass casualty terrorism, on a par with 9/11, required "Time and space to develop the ability to perform competent planning and to assemble the people, money, and resources needed for the terrorist act", "A relatively undisturbed area to recruit and train those who will carry out the operation", "A logistics network", "Access to materials needed to conduct a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack", "Reliable communications", and "Conditions in which the plan can be rehearsed and tested." Commission members argued that such activities are most easily planned and prepared in "states with rugged terrain, weak governments, and low population density" where "terrorists can hide themselves, as well as their supplies and infrastructure."⁴⁸ For Commission members, "these characteristics provide a recipe for a terrorist sanctuary or haven."⁴⁹ They noted other forms of sanctuary, including diaspora communities among liberal democratic states, but settled on a "consensus view" that "the United States should focus on remote regions and failed states."⁵⁰

Subsequent discussion of the Commission's ambiguous formula did not look much further than the territorial implications of terrorist threats. State supporters of terrorism, and the vulnerability of failed states to terrorist exploitation, figured prominently at Congressional hearings. California Congressman Brad Sherman asked: "Which states lack the desire to confront terrorists operating on their soil? Which states have the desire but lack the resources? Which governments are losing control of some of their territory, and which countries are becoming failed states where terrorists can operate freely? And which of these states, or portions thereof, contain persons who are receptive to the al-Qaeda ideology?"⁵¹ 9/11 Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste observed that "Active sponsors of terrorism must be coerced into giving up sponsorship, and if they will not, they should be dealt with severely," while "many other states are hostile to al-Qaeda, but are not able to control their own territories sufficiently to stop it. These countries, victim countries, should be bolstered wherever possible."⁵² Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, similarly, identified "the kind of geographical sanctuary that terrorists enjoy when they are harbored by sympathetic regimes like Afghanistan under the Taliban and Iraq under Saddam Hussein," and the kind "also found in the vast ungoverned regions in the world, areas that are beyond governmental control" – typically involving "notoriously difficult terrain, far removed from population centers, in countries with fragile governments."

Such statements emphasize a geographic and rural vision of terrorist sanctuaries, in line with the 9/11 Commission's realist privileging of the state in international affairs, and its special focus on Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iran, and Pakistan (among others). But the important distinctions made by Sherman, Ben-Veniste, and Wolfowitz were also accompanied by observations ranging from the crude "It is failed states that are a threat to us, because this is where the terrorists hide and this is where they plot";⁵³ to the confused "Congress need look no further than the World Trade Center bombing in New York City to see the adverse impact that this failed state in Afghanistan is having on United States national security;"⁵⁴ to the contentious "Iraq would go to the top of the list as a terrorist sanctuary if it were to become a failed state."⁵⁵ Subtler interpretations focused on practical problems of governance and terrorist agency. Ben-Veniste: "Any area where there is lawlessness and the inability of a government to control its countryside is an area fertile for exploitation by terrorists", and "areas where a government cannot control its borders may well provide an area for terrorists who will take root and move to strike at us."

Oral and written congressional testimony also provides a glimpse into policy concerns with various types of sanctuary, although the issue is only addressed in the most rudimentary, conflated, and awkwardly differentiated terms. "Sponsorship, support, and sanctuary" and "sanctuaries, leadership, finances, and command, control and communications"⁵⁶ were repeatedly grouped as targets in a holistic approach to counter-terrorism "using all instruments of national power". Paul Wolfowitz theorized that in addition to the geographic space terrorists occupy, the "911 terrorists themselves were able to create a kind of sanctuary inside the United States and other democratic countries, exploiting the very freedom and openness they were attacking in order to hide their evil plans."⁵⁷ He noted the ideological sanctuary "our enemies enjoy when extremist clerics provide cover by sanctioning terrorism, by recruiting new adherents, and by intimidating moderate clerics from speaking out against them;" and "cyber" sanctuary, "the 'space' that exists through communications networks made possible by modern technology."

J. Cofer Black offered keen insights into the problem. Black has gained a fair degree of notoriety in recent years for his association with Xe Services, formerly known as Blackwater - a private security firm that has risen to prominence and faced legal action for its contract operations in Iraq (among many other places). Prior to his career in the private sector, he had served as a CIA officer for almost three decades, including a rough and tumble stint as Station Chief in Sudan from 1993-1995.⁵⁸ He appeared before Congress as Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism at the U.S. Department of State. His testimony intimated that problems of sanctuary are shaped by a relational logic or underlying hierarchy of needs. "The removal of the Taliban regime from Afghanistan," he noted, "stripped al-Qaeda of primary sanctuary and support and shut down long-standing terrorist training camps." He also alluded to the importance of dispersed and niche basing operations, differentiating between training and other sites of terrorist activity: "Although our work in Afghanistan continues to root out remnants of al-Qaeda," he stated, "that organization has lost a vital safe haven. Our on-going operations against al-Qaeda have served to isolate the leadership and to sever communications links with operatives scattered around the globe."⁵⁹

Black's statements were the nuanced exception to the rule. Policymakers have otherwise put forward a scattershot list of attributes within a thinly conceptualized framework, now enshrined on the public website of the Office the Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the US State Department.⁶⁰ The conventional wisdom, one might surmise, had been accepted somewhat uncritically, although it certainly had its detractors. It also appeared, moreover, to have been articulated and internalized in different ways by various organs of government. Initial rounds of presidential rhetoric in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, for example, can be clearly attributed to neoconservative and evangelical sensibilities within the administration, as captured by its speechwriters. The post-modern language of the 911 Commission and State Department models, on the other hand, is strikingly intellectual, if vague, in its consideration of the subject - which suggests the possibility of external influence.

One possible source for this was David Kilcullen, a retired Australian Army officer and senior advisor to Ambassador at Large For Counterterrorism Henry Crumpton, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, General David Petraeus in Iraq, and now General Stanley McChrystal in Afghanistan. Among US defense analysts, milbloggers, and policymakers interested in insurgency and counterinsurgency, Kilcullen is a demi-god bequeathed of a uniquely compelling combination of advanced academic qualifications (a PhD in political anthropology), extensive military experience (Special Forces with combat tours in East Timor and Iraq), and an Australian accent. He is also the author of a number of extremely influential papers, prior to the 2009 publication of his best-selling book *The Accidental Guerrilla: How To Fight Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*.⁶¹

The first of them, *Complex Warfighting*, was a 2004 Australian Defence Force concept paper that described a distributed form of combat set amidst "urban clutter" and "complex terrain" where physical, human, and informational landscapes require special navigation. Conceptually, it was avant-garde - though not without parallels among modern military thinkers. In the US, echoes of its sensitivity to spatial issues can now be found in the US Department of Defense's contentious Human Terrain System, which engaged social scientists as ethnographic advisors to military staff on operations, and in such landmark documents as US Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24: Counterinsurgency - notable for the way its lead author, Petraeus, engaged the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government to ensure that it complied with the laws of armed conflict, and with humanitarian principles more generally.

Kilcullen subsequently published a brace of articles in mainstream academic journals wherein he likened Al Qaeda's expeditionary form of terrorism to "global counterinsurgency", which until recently, was the frame of choice for US policy options vis-a-vis Al Qaeda and other sources of transnational militancy.⁶² The spatial sensitivity of Kilcullen's earlier writing, however, was much less evident in his later work. Moreover, his descriptions of safe haven issues in *The Accidental Guerrilla* rely almost exclusively on State Department descriptors - publicly articulated just prior to his tenure as a senior counterterrorism strategist at the State Department.⁶³ He was, therefore, unlikely to have had a direct hand in crafting the original

language of "geographic", "ideological", "virtual" and "democratic" sanctuaries, but his prior and subsequent work on the subject certainly suggest an affinity for State's viewpoint.⁶⁴

As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan progressed, interest in the safe haven concept ebbed and flowed. Towards the end of Bush's second term, various officials, advisors and pundits turned anew to it as a lynchpin justification of various programs and policy issues. In November 2008, former CIA director Michael Hayden extolled the virtues of drone strikes into Pakistan: "By making a safe haven feel less safe," he claimed, "we keep al Qaeda guessing. We make them doubt their allies; question their methods, their plans, even their priorities."⁶⁵ That same month, Kilcullen told *New Yorker* writer George Packer and *Newsweek* editor Fareed Zakaria in separate interviews that a "countersanctuary strategy" was needed for Afghanistan and Pakistan - though in neither case did he elaborate a meaning that might have diverged from a general commitment to population-centric counterinsurgency.⁶⁶ A few months later, in late March 2009, *The New Republic* printed an awkward straw man argument on safe havens that paid homage to Kilcullen's terminology and sparked heated debate among milbloggers, think tankers, and various counterterrorism cognoscenti on both sides of the Atlantic.⁶⁷

Extensions: The Obama Administration

The debate continued to simmer at a low boil, but picked up a notch towards the end of the summer 2009 as the Obama Administration reprioritized the and US and NATO mission in Afghanistan. In August, President Barack Obama explained to an audience of military veterans "If left unchecked, the Taliban insurgency will mean an even larger safe haven from which al Qaeda would plot to kill more Americans."⁶⁸ A month later, Georgetown University's Paul Pillar, a former CIA official and Princeton PhD turned author and academic, wrote in the *Washington Post* that "rationales for maintaining the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan are varied and complex, but they all center on one key tenet: that Afghanistan must not be allowed to again become a haven for terrorist groups, especially al-Qaeda." Pillar's position was that U.S. efforts in Afghanistan would do little to mitigate terrorist threats to the United States. "In the past couple of decades," he wrote, "international terrorist groups have thrived by exploiting globalization and information technology, which has lessened their dependence on physical havens... by utilizing networks such as the Internet, terrorists' organizations have become more network-like, not beholden to any one headquarters." As the US continues to shape its Afghan policy, debate has focused on the logic of large-footprint counterinsurgency operations, which assumes a high troop-to-population ratio - 600,000 for Afghanistan, according to one estimate based on a formula for ideal counterinsurgency conditions.

Not only is the approach unsustainable in single-region intervention, critics of the approach argue, but its logic collapses on the whole-world scale of "global counterinsurgency" (per Kilcullen), wherein troop-ratio requirements and mission lifecycles would be astronomical - on an order or magnitude exceeding even Sir Adam Roberts' "revival of imperialism".⁶⁹ Echoing von Hippel's characterization of Night Raiders and Reluctant Interveners, the current debate generally hinges on these two options: commit to a large-footprint counterinsurgency

operation, saturating the country with thousands more troops; or turn to more narrowly focused counterterrorism options that do not require a large or continuous presence and focus on a much more limited set of goals and activities. For Pillar, the latter eliminates the need for concern about safe havens. "A significant jihadist terrorist threat to the United States persists," he wrote, "but that does not mean it will consist of attacks instigated and commanded from a South Asian haven, or that it will require a haven at all." The declining fortunes of Al Qaeda were a strong argument against the counterinsurgency option. Its "role in that threat," he noted, "is now less one of commander than of ideological lodestar, and for that role a haven is almost meaningless."⁷⁰

Pillar's depiction of havens as a problem of exclusively state-level proportions was (and is) consistent with growing concern in the US that continued involvement in Afghanistan will prove itself to be a costly exercise in futility. Framing the problem in this way was political astute: by focusing on the substantive issue of Al Qaeda's disposition, it essentially took the havens frame off the table, providing Obama with the maximum flexibility to decide what to do next in Afghanistan. With all due respect to Pillar's professional and scholarly acumen, however, the approach is less useful in intellectual terms, eliding as it does the differing scales and configurations of militant basing operations discussed in this paper.⁷¹ Indeed, as David Betz brilliantly noted at *Kings of War*, the faculty blog of the War Studies Department at King's College London, "If Afghanistan becomes the new Somalia then maybe Somalia will become the new Afghanistan. Terrorists will find some other dismal corner of the Earth from which to base their operations. [The] point, I think, is that that could be in Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, Djibouti or wherever. Indeed, it might be just a corner of one of these places – a region, a few city blocks, or a house. Indeed, fine havens may be found in communities even in not so benighted places such as our green and pleasant land."⁷²

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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NOTES

¹ General Stanley McChrystal Address. London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2 October 2009. Full text available at <http://www.iiss.org/recent-key-addresses/general-stanley-mcchrystal-address/>.

² See Daniel Byman, *Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 65-66; see also Tal Becker, *Terrorism and the State: Rethinking the Rules of State Responsibility* (Hart Publishing, 2006).

³ See Carol McQueen, *Humanitarian Intervention and Safety Zones: Iraq, Bosnia and Rwanda* (Palgrave MacMillan, 2005). See also Sarah Kenyon Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Campos, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005).

⁴ See Rex Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival: The Palestinians in Lebanon* (Westview Press, 1990).

⁵ See Michael Sorkin, Ed., *Indefensible Space: The Architecture of the National Insecurity State* (New York: Routledge, 2008).

⁶ See Ron E. Hassner, *War on Sacred Grounds* (Cornell University Press, 2009); I E. Christine Fair & Sumit Ganguly, Eds., *Treading on Hallowed Grounds: Counterinsurgency Operations in Sacred Spaces* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

⁷ Peter Beaumont, *The Secret Life of War: Journeys Through Modern Conflict* (London: Harvill Secker/Random House, 2009), 9-10.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ See, for example, Robert Kaplan, "The Revenge of Geography," *Foreign Policy* (May/June 2009), available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4862; and Thomas M. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, "'No Sign Until the Burst of Fire': Understanding the Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier," *International Security* Vol. 32, No. 4 (Spring 2008): 41-77.

¹⁰ Cited in John Gerard Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," *International Organization* Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998): 855-885 (at 856).

¹¹ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make Of It: The Social Construction Of Power Politics," *International Organization* Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992): 391-425.

¹² Richard Jackson, "Writing Wars on Terrorism: The Rhetoric of Counter-Terrorism from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush, Jr.," Paper Presented at the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) Annual Conference, College Park, Maryland, USA, 22-25 June 2005.

¹³ Sir Adam Roberts, "The 'War on Terror' in Historical Perspective," Written Evidence Submitted by Professor Sir Adam Roberts to the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, 06 December 2004.

¹⁴ Karin Von Hippel, "Terrorist Space," *The World Today* (February 2002), 10-11.

¹⁵ Roberts, "The 'War on Terror' in Historical Perspective."

¹⁶ McQueen, *Safety Zones*, p. 6-8.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, 7.

¹⁸ Matthew Yglesias, "How Important Are Safe Havens?" *Think Progress* (31 March 2009). Available at http://yglesias.thinkprogress.org/archives/2009/03/how_important_are_safe_havens.php, accessed 14 October 2009.

¹⁹ Byman, *Deadly Connections*, 54.

²⁰ Emphasis mine. Distinctions between state provision and non-state acquisition are critical indicators of actor intent and agency, and central to any reconfiguration of sanctuary concepts and practices.

²¹ Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival*, 3-5.

²² See especially Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (Free Press, 1991). See also Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (Zenith Press, 2004); and Frank Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars* (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute For Policy Studies, 2007).

²³ Elaine Sciolino and Eric Schmitt, "A Not Very Private Feud Over Terrorism," *New York Times* (8 June 2008), available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/08/weekinreview/08sciolino.html>. See also Bruce Hoffman, "The Myth of Grass Roots Terrorism: Why Osama bin Laden Still Matters," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 87, No.3 (May/June 2008): 133-138.

²⁴ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 41-44.

²⁵ See especially Stephen Graham, Ed., *Cities, War and Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2004). From within the discipline, see Martin Coward, *Urbicide: The Politics of Urban Destruction* (Routledge, 2008).

²⁶ Eyal Weizmann, "The Politics of Verticality: Maps of Israeli Settlements," *OpenDemocracy.net* (25 April 2002); Available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-politicsverticality/article_631.jsp, accessed 14 October 2009. See also Weizmann, *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation* (Verso, 2007).

²⁷ Ron E. Hassner, *War on Sacred Grounds*; see also Hassner, "Counterinsurgency and the Problem of Sacred Space," chapter in Fair and Sanguly, *Treading on Hallowed Ground*, p. 13-36.

²⁸ Ron E. Hassner, "'At the Horns of the Altar': Counterinsurgency and the Religious Roots of the Sanctuary Practice," *Civil Wars* Vol. 10, No. 1 (Winter 2008): 22-39;

²⁹ *Ibid*, 29.

³⁰ In this author's opinion, realist national security frames treat sanctuary as a two-dimensional problem of states. They elide alternative models and encourages extreme linear interpretations of spatial requirements. They also preclude the individual intent and agency of actors who navigate such cartographies. Terrain analysis of the sort that might inform an international relations of safe havens and

middle ground, in other words, is certainly well served by a static template of natural and built environment phenomena, but it is an incomplete ecology.

³¹ Matthew Rosenberg and Siobhan Gorman, "Al Qaeda's Diminished Role Stirs Afghan Troop Debate," *Wall Street Journal* (5 October 2009), A1.

³² Elements of this section have been adapted from the introduction to the author's book *Denial of Sanctuary: Understanding Terrorist Safe Havens* (Praeger, 2007).

³³ "President Urges Readiness and Patience : Remarks by the President, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Attorney General John Ashcroft, Camp David, Maryland," Office of the Press Secretary (15 September 2001).

³⁴ President George Bush, *Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People*, Washington, D.C., Office of the Press Secretary, 20 September 2001.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ President George Bush, *Radio Address of the President to the Nation*, Office of the Press Secretary, 29 September 2001.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ President Holds Prime Time News Conference, Office of the Press Secretary (11 October 2001).

³⁹ "DoD News Briefing - Norwegian Minister of Defense Kristin Krohn Devold; Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld Presenting." News Transcript, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (2 April 2002). Available at <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3388>, accessed 11 October 2009.

⁴⁰ David Sanger, "Biblical Quotes Said to Adorn Pentagon Reports," *New York Times* (18 May 2009). See also Robert Draper, "And He Shall Be Judged," *GQ* (June 2009), and especially its companion slideshow of the report covers, "Onward Christian Soldiers," *GQ* (June 2009), available at <http://www.gq.com/news-politics/newsmakers/donald-rumsfeld-pentagon-papers> (accessed 15 October 2009).

⁴¹ Report of the 9/11 Commission, Chapter 12.

⁴² Francis T Miko, *Removing Terrorist Sanctuaries: The 9/11 Commission Recommendations and U.S. Policy* Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 10 August 2004), 2.

⁴³ *The 9/11 Commission Report: Denying Sanctuaries To Terrorists*. Hearing Before The Subcommittee On International Terrorism, Nonproliferation And Human Rights. House Of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress, Second Session, 06 August 2004 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004). [Hereafter *Denying Sanctuary to Terrorists*]; *Hearing on Denying Terrorist Sanctuaries*. U.S. House of Representatives Committee On Armed Services Press Release, 10 August 2004.

⁴⁴ William P. Pope, *Eliminating Terrorist Sanctuaries: The Role of Security Assistance*. Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation. Washington D.C., 10 March 2005.

⁴⁵ Michael J. Gershon, *Heroic Conservatism Why Republicans Need to Embrace America's Ideals (And Why They Deserve to Fail If They Don't)* (HarperOne, 2007).

⁴⁶ Gerson, in addition to being a journalist of note, is also a Senior Research Fellow in the Center on Faith and International Affairs at the Institute for Global Engagement, an Arlington, Virginia based think tank. Details at <http://www.globalengage.org/about/staff/950-michael-j-gerson.html>. Accessed 09 October 2009.

⁴⁷ Matthew Scully, "Present at the Creation," *Atlantic Monthly* (September 2007). Full text available at <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200709/michael-gerson>.

⁴⁸ *Denying Terrorist Sanctuaries*, 12. See also Prepared Statement of Deputy Executive Director Christopher A. Kojm and Team Leader Susan Ginsburg, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States before the House International Relations Committee, Before the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. August 19, 2004

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 15.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 6-7.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 34.

⁵⁷ Opening Statement of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz Before the House Armed Services Committee, *Hearing on Denying Terrorist Sanctuaries* (10 August 2004), 6.

⁵⁸ See especially Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (Penguin Press, 2004), especially p.272-273, for a vivid account of Black's escapades.

⁵⁹ *Denying Terrorist Sanctuaries*, 31, 35.

⁶⁰ At <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/>. Interestingly, the State Department prioritization of "safe havens" as a central feature of counterterrorism has evolved in subtle ways since 2002, when it first appeared in various State Department annual country reports. The most recent iteration indicates safe havens consisting of "physical", "cyber", and "ideological" spaces - which, along terrorist leadership and underlying conditions, represent various levels of a terrorism "threat complex". At <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/enemy/index.htm#defeat2>, accessed 16 October 2009.

⁶¹ David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: How to Fight Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (London: Hurst & Co. Publishers, 2009).

⁶² David J. Kilcullen, "Counter-Insurgency Redux," *Survival* Vol. 48, No. 4 (December 2006): 111-130; Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," *Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 28, No. 4 (August 2005): 597-617.

⁶³ And in a breathtaking elision of significant insurgent and counterinsurgent theory on the subject, cites only the State Department.

⁶⁴ Kilcullen's influence at that early stage is purely speculation on my part - based on various biographical details available on the web, timelines preclude direct influence - but not indirect or prior. I corresponded briefly via email with Kilcullen while he was in Iraq in 2007 as Petraeus' advisor, but he has not responded to subsequent queries. Interestingly, the training of various Western and Israeli military officers in alternative spatial theories - looking to the works of Deleuze and Guattari in particular - is well documented in Eyal Weizmann, *Hollow Land: Israel's Architectures of Occupation* (Verso, 2007).

⁶⁵ Nick Schifrin, "U.S. Drone Strikes With Deadly Accuracy," *ABC News* (19 November 2008). Available at <http://a.abcnews.com/print?id=6289748>, accessed 11 October 2009.

⁶⁶ George Packer, "Kilcullen on Afghanistan," *Interesting Times/The New Yorker* (14 November 2008). Available at <http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/georgepacker/2008/11/kilcullen-on-af.html>, accessed 15 May 2009. Fareed Zakharia, "How To Fix Afghanistan," *Global Public Square/CNN* (17 November 2008). Video available at <http://edition.cnn.com/video/#/video/politics/2008/11/17/fz.fix.afghanistan.cnn?iref=videosearch>, accessed 15 May 2009.

⁶⁷ Andrew Exum, "No Place to Hide," *The New Republic* (31 August 2009). Available at <http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/no-place-hide>, accessed 15 May 2009. See also Thomas Hegghammer, "Virtual Safe Havens and the War of Ideas," *Jihadica* (31 March 2009) - Available at <http://www.jihadica.com/virtual-safe-havens-and-the-war-of-ideas>; Tim Stevens, "Virtual Sanctuaries and Auto-Radicalization," *Ubiwar* (31 March 2009) - Available at <http://ubiwar.com/2009/03/31/virtual-sanctuaries-and-auto-radicalisation/>; Andrew Exum, "On The Piece in TNR," *Abu Muqawama/CNAS* (31 March 2009), Available at <http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2009/03/piece-tnr.html>; Exum, "Arguing Safe Havens - Updated," *Abu Muqawama/CNAS* (31 March 2009) - Available at <http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2009/03/arguing-safe-havens-updated.html>. Editors, "No Place To Hide," *Small Wars Journal* (31 March 2009) - Available at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/03/no-place-to-hide/>. All sites accessed 31 March 2009.

⁶⁸ Heather Maher, "Obama Defends Afghan Strategy in Speech Before Veterans," *RFE/RL* (18 August 2009). Available at http://www.rferl.org/content/Obama_Defends_Afghan_Strategy_In_Speech_Before_Veterans/1802015.html, accessed 11 October 2009.

⁶⁹ "Interview: Col. Andrew Bacevich," *Frontline: Obama's War* (13 October 2009). Available at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/obamaswar/interviews/bacevich.html>, accessed 15 October 2009.

⁷⁰ Paul R. Pillar, "Who's Afraid of a Terrorist Haven?" *Washington Post* (16 September 2009). Available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/15/AR2009091502977.html>, accessed 11 October 2009.

⁷¹ Michael A. Innes, "The Safe Havens Myth," *Foreign Policy* (12 October 2009). Available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/12/the_safe_haven_myth.

⁷² David Betz, "Two Friends in Cage Fight in Latest Foreign Policy," *Kings of War* (14 October 2009). Available at <http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/2009/10/14/two-friends-in-cage-fight-in-latest-foreign-policy/>. I should note that Betz was commenting on an article I'd published in Foreign Policy, and displaying exceptionally sound judgment by agreeing with my argument.